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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant American incorporates by reference herein its 
Statement of the Casef including the Statement of Facts, as 
encompassed therein, as set forth in its Appellant's Brief upon 
Writ of Certiorari to Utah Court of Appeals (hereinafter 
"appellant's brief11). This brief is submitted in response to 
Dakal and Diversified1s Respondents' Brief (hereinafter 
"respondents' brief) which is on file in with the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In response to respondents' brief/ American submits that the 
trial court's decision is correct and is consistent with the 
proper standards for inquiry in cases such as this. While the 
trial court utilized proper standardsf the Utah Court of Appeals 
applied the wrong standard of review by erroneously characterizing 
this case as one presented on stipulated facts. Even if the 
instant case presented no dispute of fact, conflicting or 
inconsistent inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts and the 
issue is not one of law but one of fact. 
American agrees with Dakal and Diversified that in this casef 
whether plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers for value was a legal 
conclusion. Further, based upon the inadequacy of consideration 
and other factorsf respondents acquired title to the property with 
actual notice of American's claim andf therefore, respondents' 
title is subject to American's equitable lien. Finally, plaintiff 
Dakal did have a duty of inquiry regarding American's claim 
but did not satisfy said duty, 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONSISTENT WITH 
PROPER STANDARDS FOR INQUIRY IN CASES SUCH AS THIS AND IS 
CORRECT. 
I. THE COURT OP APPEALS DID NOT APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD 
OF REVIEW FOR THIS CASE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS DECISION SOLELY 
UPON "STIPULATED FACTS." 
American submits that Utah Court of Appeals erred by holding 
in the instant action that the standard for review of a case 
presented on stipulated facts is to treat the findings based 
thereon as the functional equivalent of conclusions of law. 
Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loanf 739 P.2d 1133, 
1134f 1136f (Utah App. 1987). First, in response to respondents1 
brief, American assets that this case was not presented on 
stipulated facts. 
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified contend that at the trial 
court level this case was presented on stipulated facts (RB 2) , 
that no dispute of fact existed (RB 1) and that the factual 
setting of this case, although arduous in scope, did not bring 
with it any dispute as to what had occurred (RB 3) . Such 
conceptions on the part of the Utah Court of Appeals and such 
representations by Plaintiffs are simply not correct. 
Certainly the trial court stated that it understood that the 
case invnlvpil 'Yen t i i in I ,u:f •, fliat A\ H in dispute heie" iTi 4 L 
2 0 - 2 1 ) . At : the ti:i a ]
 r even counsel for Dakal i*. ' Diversified did 
not represent to the trial court that nh ln or the facts with 
r e s p e c t t c t:I::i :i s iikill h i iiiull " ml I " o l I IK il ..< I l u i l a i t " n e e d e d 
will be able to be stipulated to. Rather plaintiffs' counsel told 
the court that "most" of the facts with regard to this matter and 
" in o s t n o f t h € d c c i i in e n t s t h a t a r e needed w i 1 1 b e a b 1 e to be 
stipulated to (Ti -111 I. ,,'S, I'nr 5 L 1 -2 1 
It is true that a lengthy stipulation in regard to the facts 
was read into the record (beginning Tr 4 L 3) «. But i t is of 
importance to note that the stipulation covered not only 
stipu 1 ated facts, . deel st i p\ .\ *•..*- i n g 
testimony which would have been given ;A .'<J: » witnesses (if 
they had testified^ regarc t o disputed facts. That is f rather 
t h a n p i: e * - * • lint a ] e i I g I: h y 11: :i a 3 , 11: I e p a i: t i e s 
avoided such by submitting statement of what their respective 
witnesses would have testified to if called. American submits 
t h a t" t. h e f a c • 1: s «:i 11 cl I 111» i e a s o r ,i b I e i n f e :i : enc e, => t o be d i: awi I t h e i: e f i: ora 
were thus presented for determination as if the case had been 
fully tried, See Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 
139 A.?d I ,»« 1 ?!i (.1958) 
An example that the oral stipulation included stipulations as 
to conflicting testimony which would have been given by various 
w i t n e s s e s i i: I r e g a i :« :i ili <:: • • :i i s p u t e cl f a c 1 i; =» i s i 11 u s 11: a t e d b y 
plaintiffs' counsel himself wherein in referring to a $14,000 
finder's fee charged by Brad Pentalute for a $60,000 purchase of 
the subject property, plaintiffs' counsel in reciting part of the 
stipulation to the court stated that, 
American Savings & Loan would proffer that 
their peoplef if called to testify, would 
testify that that [Mr. Pentalute's fee] is an 
abnormally high finder's fee and is an over-
payment with respect to those services. 
(Tr 21 L 3-6). 
Regarding the conflicting testimony Mr. Pentalute would give 
if he, Mr. Pentalute, had been called upon to testify, Mr. Mooney, 
still reciting the parties' stipulation to the court, declared 
that, 
Mr. Pentalute's testimony, at the time of his 
deposition, and if called to testify, would be 
that is his normal, within the range of his 
normal and customary fee and what he charges 
for putting together those types of distress 
sale transactions because of the large number 
that he has to review in order to find the 
ones that are truly good buys, truly clean. 
(Tr 21 L 7-13). On page 3 of its respondents' brief, plaintiffs 
noted that the trial court in its Memorandum Decision directed the 
parties to refer to the stipulation of facts (TC 2). In so doing, 
the trial court was referring the parties to a document which 
contained inconsistent facts. 
While plaintiffs in their brief acknowledge that the trial 
court "reviewed the stipulation of facts, examined the documents 
and considered the testimony of witnesses," they ignore the trial 
court's own statement that i - "carefully" reviewed t , transcript 
o J * * ' "• airy 
evidence received i.\ we :onsideredf1 the testimony of wit-
nesses (RB 3 rp )bviously the trial court went ho great 
effort to s 11; t„ a - vn^v presented Li} the 
parties in contrast -i m e o.^rt of Appeals which f although it had 
access to the written record, obviously could not judge the 
credibility of witnesses. 
In a nonjury trial it i s the trial judge's prerogative to 
find the facts, include r-u ldging the
 c r e d i b i l i t y of witnesses/ 
weighing realiabi] i; other evidence, and drawing fairly 
derived and reasonable inferences therefrom. Search v. Union 
Pacific R, Co 649 P 2- 3 48, 50 <U1 \ il: : ] 9 82) Sanchez v . Molycorp, 
Inc., 103 N.M. ] 48, 1 03 P.2d 925, 93 0 (N.M. App. 1 9 8 5 ) , 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that on appeal, it reviews 
t h e ? e v i d k»n e o i 11 i il i \ \ II11 i n i u f. I llr i v 11 r a lb I i 1 »I I I u • f. t i.. i ! r o u r t 
findings. Further, where there is competent evidence to support 
the findings this Court must sustain them. Search at 50; Nance v. 
City of Prove ">£* " -*" DeVas v. 
Noble, 1*> T T^i - ;-. 2d 290, 29 Charlton v. 
Hackett, ta — .?ti ~f> * *61 * . Tha* > . where 
there wa , • * - . ial 
court, the appellate court does not reverse the trial court's 
judgment unless there are errors involved in the matter which 
r eq u i r e :i : e v e r s a ] a s a ma 1 t e r :  • £ 11 a w Parker v. Telegift 
International, Inc. f 29 Utah 2d 8 7 , 505 P.2d 301, 302 (1973). 
It is important to note that if a case is heard without a 
jury, the trial court has the exclusive function of appraising 
credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, 
drawing inferences from facts established, resolving conflicts in 
evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact. Herman v. 
Speed King Mfg. Co., 675 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Wyo. 1984). Thus, in 
the instant action, American submits that the trial court has the 
exclusive function of appraising the witness credibility and 
drawing the inferences from the established facts. The trial 
court, and not the Court of Appeals, was in a position to observe 
the witnesses, note their demeanor on the stand, and appraise 
their credibility. 
In addition, the trial court has greater discretion in 
exercising its judgment as to the credibility of a witness who is 
a party to the cause, from the fact of his interest, than as to 
one whose interest is not involved. 89 C.J.S. 387, Trial §593. 
Certainly in the instant case, the trial court should have had a 
greater discretion than the Court of Appeals in exercising its 
judgment as to the credibility of Wayne Peck who, even though he 
was not a party, was the principal and alter ego of both 
plaintiffs (Tr 59 L 13-25 TC 6) and had a great interest in this 
action's outcome. Thus, it cannot be disputed that the trial 
court had the sole opportunity to judge Mr. Peck's credibility and 
to draw inferences and reasonable deductions therefrom. 
In addition to dealing with proffers of inconsistent 
testimony in the parties' stipulation and appraising witness 
credibility, the trial court was also involved in determining 
factual issues involving notice and duty of inquiry (Appellant's 
Brief at 18). For these reasons, American respectfully, but 
strongly, disagrees with the plaintiffs' and the Court of Appeals' 
relegation of the trial court's findings of fact to conclusions of 
law on the basis that the trial court's findings of fact were 
tantamount to conclusions of law with the stipulation of facts 
being the functional equivalent of true findings of fact (RB 4). 
Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133, 
1136 (Utah App. 1987). 
Even if, as Dakal and Diversified suggest, no dispute of fact 
exists in the present action (RB 1 and 2) , American insists that 
conflicting or inconsistent inferences may be drawn from 
undisputed facts, and that the issue is not one of law but one of 
fact. Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 653 P.2d 201 (Okl. 
1982); Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, 734 P.2d 1321 (Okl. App. 1987). 
Thus assuming, arguendo, that the instant case consisted of 
uncontradicted probative facts, it is possible that conflicting 
inferences could be deducted from uncontradicted probative facts. 
Gonzales v. Derrington, 10 Cal.Rptr. 700, 702-703 (1961); Bonavita 
v. Enriqht, 294 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294, 30 A.D.2d 1027 (1968); Lawyer 
v. Boling, 71 Wis.2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514, 517 (1976). Further the 
trial court may resolve such conflicts. Gonzales at 703. 
In the case of Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, supra, 
the claimant sought workers compensation because he was injured in 
a parking lot when leaving five minutes early for a lunch break. 
The trial judge found that the injury sustained was not one 
arising out of or [sic] in the course of claimant's employment. 
Thomas at 202. The order denying compensation was affirmed by an 
appellate panel of the Workers' Compensation Court, but the Court 
of Appeals vacated the order. Id. In granting certiorari and 
vacating the decision of the appellate court, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court noted, 
While the facts are uncontroverted, the 
evidence, taken as a whole, does lead to two 
equally reasonable but conflicting or in-
consistent inferences. 
Id_. at 203. 
Importantly, the high Oklahoma Court notes that whenever 
conflicting or inconsistent inferences may be drawn from 
undisputed facts, the issue is not one of law but one of fact. 
Id. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed Thomas in the case of 
Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, supra, wherein it stated that, 
Ultimately, where differing conclusions or 
inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, 
the question ... is one of fact for the trier 
of fact ... 
Pepco, Inc. at 1324. The Court in Pepco also reiterated its 
holding in Thomas by stating the following in upper case letters: 
WHENEVER CONFLICTING OR INCONSISTENT INFER-
ENCES MAY BE DRAWN FROM UNDISPUTED FACTS, THE 
ISSUE IS NOT ONE OF LAW BUT ONE OF FACT. 
Id. [Emphasis not mine]. 
The cases cited by plaintiffs in their brief for the 
proposition that the trial court's findings are "tantamount to 
conclusions of law with the stipulation of facts being the 
functional equivalent of true findings of fact" can also be 
distinguished from the actual case at bar (RB 4). For example in 
Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792 (Ala. 1980) which is cited in 
respondents1 brief on page 4, the parties submitted an agreed 
statement of facts together with answers to interrogatories and 
affidavits, but it appears the trial court was not faced with 
having to judge the credibility of any witnesses. Stiles at 794. 
In their brief, Dakal and Diversified, also rely upon 
Spencer v. Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, 216 N.W.2d 406 
(Iowa 1974) , which involved an action brought by a city for the 
use and benefit of its statutory board of trustees having 
management and control of the public utilities of the city. The 
Supreme Court of Iowa noted that the facts in said case were not 
disputed and because no conflicting inferences could be drawn from 
the facts, it could interfere in the trial court's judgment. Cite 
of Spencer at 408. It appears, therefore, that if it had not been 
possible to draw no conflicting inferences from the facts, the 
Iowa Supreme Court would not have interfered in the judgment 
entered below. Id. 
The case of Fullerton Union High School District v. Riles, 
139 Cal.App.3rd 368, 188 Cal.Rptr. 897f 906 (App. 1983) is another 
case cited by respondents in their brief on page 4 with the 
proposition that the trial court's findings in the instant case 
are tantamount to conclusions of law with the stipulation of facts 
being a functional equivalent of true findings of fact. In 
Fullerton, the Appellate Court stated that it is bound by the 
trial court's determination of facts based upon substantial 
evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The 
Appellate Court therein also held squarely for the doctrine set 
forth by Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, supra, by stating 
that "when different inferences may be drawn from undisputed fact, 
the inference must be accepted by the appeal court. Fullerton at 
906. 
In regard to the above, the case of Schroeder v. Horack, 592 
S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. 1980) was also cited in plaintiffs' brief at 
page 4. Whereas in Schroeder it was noted that the case was tried 
on a stipulation of facts and was not involving resolution by the 
trial court of conflicting testimony, the instant case involves 
the resolution of questions of fact as well as the appraisal of 
witness credibility, all of which were absent in the Schroeder 
case. 
Plaintiffs attack American's use of the case of Dang v. Cox, 
655 P.2d 568 (Utah 1982) to support American's claim that the 
Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review (RB 5) . In 
Dang the Supreme Court of Utah recognized thatf "[when]...there 
is conflicting evidencef the [court] givets] deference to the 
trial court as the fact finder (RB 5). Dang at 660. In the same 
paragraph, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the advantageous 
position of the trial court, vis-a-vis the trial, the parties, and 
the witnesses. Id_. Dakal and Diversified claim that no factual 
disputes exist. (RB at 6). As noted herein above, American claims 
there is conflicting evidence in the instant action and that the 
trial court did have an advantageous position, vis-a-vis the 
trial, the parties and the witnesses. 
In any event, notwithstanding these circumstances as 
contended by American, the Utah Supreme Court in Dang did not 
apply said circumstances as conditions precedent for its statement 
that, 
[T]his court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court or disturb the trial court's findings 
of fact when they are based on substantial, competent, 
and admissible evidence. 
American submits that as set forth in its appellant's rief, 
the trial court's judgment and findings of fact are based on 
substantial, competent, and admissible evidence. Where it is the 
Utah Supreme Court's responsibility to review vidence as well as 
law, the Court will not disturb findings of fact made below unless 
they appear to be clearly erroneous and against the weight of 
evidence. Dang at 660; McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996 (1978). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures also states 
that, "findings of factf whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." If the Court of Appeals' 
ruling in this case is allowed to standf not only will findings of 
fact based on oral and documentary evidence be set aside which are 
not clearly erroneous/ but due regard shall not have been given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge witness credibility. 
Also, if this Honorable Court allows the Court of Appeals" ruling 
to standf it will not only emasculate the effect of Rule 52(a), 
but will also totally nullify the trial court's perceptions of 
witness testimony which the trial court itself conceded played a 
part in rendering its decision in this case (TC 2). 
II. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE 
WAS A LEGAL CONCLUSION IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
American agrees with plaintiffs that plaintiffs were bona 
fide purchasers for value was a legal conclusion in the instant 
case (RB 7); see Conclusion of Law numbered 9 which states: 
Neither of the plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, Inc., 
nor Dakal, Inc. was a bona fide purchaser of the 
property. 
Nowhere does American suggest that the ultimate determination 
of whether a party is a bona fide purchaser is a strictly factual 
determination as alleged by Dakal and Diversified on page 7 of 
their respondents brief. On page 18 of its appellant's brief, 
American cited the important Utah case of Johnson v. Bell^ 666 P.2d 
3 8, 310 (Utah 1983) which indicates that the determination of 
whether a purchaser received actual notice of prior unrecorded 
interests is a question of fact. Further, on the same page of its 
appellant's brief, American also acknowledged that the determi-
nation of whether the duty of inquiry was satisfiedf is also a 
question of fact (see sources therein cited). 
American also agrees that it is possible that some of the 
court's determinations combine both law and factf but defendant 
also asserts that the ultimate finding that plaintiffs were not 
bona fide purchasers is a legal conclusion. This assertion is 
underscored by the circumstance that such finding was only set 
forth as a conclusion of law and not as a finding of fact by 
American in the conclusions of law prepared at the trial court's 
direction by American's counsel (TC 12, C/L 9). 
Thus, American agrees whole-heartedly with plaintiffs' 
citation of the following excerpt from the trial court's decision 
and in so doing note that American has always treated as a legal 
conclusion the determination of whether Dakal and Diversified were 
bona fide purchasers: 
In applying the foregoing legal principle enunciated by 
the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this 
casef the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor 
Diversified was a bona fide purchaser of the property 
(TC 6; RB 10). 
It is important to note, however, that in the above quotation, 
the trial court acknowledged its limited role only as to the 
ultimate question of whether plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers 
of the property. Certainly, as already hereinabove stated near the 
beginning of this brief, the trial court also recognized its role 
as a finder of fact (Tr 4L 20-21)• 
On page 13 of their brief, Dakal and Diversified assert that 
the burden of proof is upon American to refute plaintiffs1 title. 
Beginning on page 19, American in its Appellant's Brief Upon Writ 
of Certiorari sets forth the bases of its claim that Dakal and 
Diversified were not bona fide purchasers of the real property. 
Thus, if Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers of the 
property, plaintiffs' title has obviously been refuted. 
III. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO DEFENDANT AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION'S EQUITABLE LIEN. 
A. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. TOOK LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
WITH ACTUAL NOTICE OF DEFENDANT AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION'S CLAIM. 
1. Inadequacy of Consideration. 
In their brief, Dakal and Diversified mention that the sale 
price of the property as compared to market value is often an 
important consideration in determining whether purchase was without 
notice. Plaintiffs also allege that it is the primary claim of 
American in this matter (RB 14) . While the inadequacy of considera-
tion is an important claim of the American, it is simply one of the 
components of the evidence which when viewed as a whole provide 
clear, persuasive and compelling support for the trial court's 
finding that plaintiffs did have actual notice of American's 
interest. In the cases cited by Dakal and Diversified in their 
brief, it is apparent that there is no set formula as to what 
constitutes inadequate considerations. In the case of Lawley vs. 
Hickenlooper/ 212 P. 523 (Utah 1923) on page 15 of their brief/ 
plaintiffs cite the following: 
Where the contract under which the purchaser buys is 
sufficient on its face to put him upon inquiry as to 
what the consideration wasf or where it plainly shows 
that the consideration has not been paid or performed/ 
he is chargeable with notice thereof. A nominal or 
grossly inadequate consideration recited in a deed is a 
sufficient circumstance/ for a reasonable time after 
such deed is made and recorded/ to put a purchase on 
inquiry.... Lawley at 530. 
In said casef the court does not set forth the formula by 
which one could always determine whether or not consideration is 
adequate. The Restatement of the Law on Restitution simply 
indicates that the difference in value, however/ may be evidence 
that the transferee had notice that the transferor held the 
property subject to an equity in favor of another where the 
transfer is for value although the consideration is of less value 
than the property transferred. Restatement of Restitution/ 
Section 173f Comment b. 
In their respondents1 brief/ Dakal and Diversified base 
their discussion of the inadequacy of consideration upon the 
"ratio of consideration to value necessary to impart notice of an 
interest" (RC 17) . Lawleyy supray does not put a purchase on 
inquiry upon the ratio of consideration to value. Rather, a 
nominal or grossly inadequate consideration is a sufficient 
circumstance to put a purchase on inquiry. Lawley at 530. The 
case cited by Dakal and Diversified illustrate that the money 
amount and not the proportion is the determining factor. 
For example, in two of the cases cited by plaintiffs in 
which the amounts were deemed so inadequate as to defeat a pur-
chaser's claim of good faith, the inadequacies in consideration 
totalled approximately $11,800 to $13,300 (Phillips v_. Latham, 
523 S.W.2d 19 [Tex. Cir. App. 1975]) and $76,000 (Rogers v. 
Barton, 53 N.E.2d 862 (111. 19441) R.B. 17. In Morris v. Wicks, 
106 P. 1048 (Kan. 1910) , which is another case cited by Dakal and 
Diversified on page 17 of their brief, the sum of $41 was con-
sidered inadequate and the purchaser took title with notice of a 
prior claim. In Morris, no market value was set forth, but the 
consideration was given for a house and a lot. 
In the two cases cited by Dakal and Diversified wherein the 
paid amounts were deemed sufficient so as not to give rise to 
notice, the differences between market values and the amounts 
actually paid were between $1,000 and $2,000 in Noe v. Smith, 169 
P. 1108 (Ok. 1917) and $375 in Owen v. Owen, 336 S.2d 782, 785 
(La. 1976). 
In the instant case, plaintiff Dakal paid Rydalch approxi-
mately $38,000 for the subject property. Rydalch felt that the 
property was worth approximately $76,000 (Tr 11 L 25, Tr 12 L 
1-2) thus leaving a consideration inadequacy of $38,000. Upon 
visual exterior examination only, Wayne Peck determined the 
market value of the property to be between $70,000 and $75,000 
(Tr 18 L 24-25, Tr 19 L 3) with the resulting consideration 
inadequacies approximating between $32f000 and $37f000. Academy 
Appraisal Associates appraised the property at $103,000 
(Defendant's Ex* 39, Tr 70 L 6-7) in which instance the in-
adequacy of consideration would be approximately $65,000. There-
fore , in the instant action, the inadequacy of consideration by 
any calculation is between $38f000 and $65,000. American submits 
that in line with the case cited by Dakal and Diversified (RB 17) 
the sales price paid by Dakal was so inadequate as to put the 
plaintiffs on notice. 
2. Other Factors Affecting Notice. 
In referring to other factors affecting notice, the 
plaintiffs cite the cases of Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah 
1933) and Morris v. Blunt, 99 P. 686 (Utah 1909) (RB 19-20) and 
the Salt Lake Garfield & Western Railway Company v. Allied 
Materials Company, 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955) (RB 22-23) for the 
proposition that more than a vague reference to a possible 
interest is necessary to impart notice of a claim, but rather, a 
certain threshold must be met. The identify of the source from 
whom reasonable inquiry could be made must be clear. Regarding 
whether there is more than a vague reference to American's 
interest in the subject property, Brad Pentelute was aware of 
American's lien in the property, at the time the Rydalches 
acquired it from M & W Enterprises (TR 16-19; Defendant's Exs. 
35, 36, 38, 40). In addition, the identity of American as the 
source from whom inquiry could be made was clear. 
Beginning on page 24 of their brief, respondents apply the 
concept of fault on the basis of Peterson v. Carter, 359 P.2d 
1055 (Utah 1961) and Townsend v. Hooper, 2 Utah 548 (1880). In so 
doing, the respondents have misinterpreted Peterson in likening 
it unto Townsend, The Townsend case refers to "fault ... in 
concealing [an] agreement." In such instancef fault in con-
cealing an agreement amounts to an intentional act. Never has it 
been alleged in the instant case that American intentionally 
released its lien, Peterson, on the other handf mentions 
"failure to protect," Failure to protect amounts to negligent 
mistake. Peterson clearly does not represent the idea that fault 
is a factor which may be used against a claiming party. 
Peterson, is different from the case at bar. In Peterson, 
the court found against the plaintiffs as a matter of equity 
because the agreement the plaintiffs relied upon was found to be 
a "so-called and erroneously assumed 'vendor's lien'." Id_. at 
1057. The agreement relied upon by the plaintiffs in Peterson 
was not a bona fide lien. In the case at bar, a valid pre-
existing lien clearly existed. 
B. PLAINTIFF DAKAL, INC. DID NOT SATISFY ITS EXISTING 
DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
On page 28 of its respondents' brief, Dakal maintains that 
facts known to it did not create a duty of inquiry. Even the 
Court of Appeals conceded that "the circumstances were suspicious 
and called for inquiry." Diversified at 1137. None of the 
c ses cited by respondents in their brief detract from the trial 
court's findings that Pentelute and/or Peck had more than 
sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry into 
whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to 
American and whether American had made a mistake 
releasing its trust deed on the property (TC 7). 
Factors which indicate Pentelute and/or Peck had more than 
sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry include 
the following: Both Pentelute and Peck had substantial experience 
and dealings with distress properties and real estate transac-
tions in general and were aware of the approximate market value 
of the property, and Pentelute was aware of American's interest 
in the property at the time that Rydalches acquired the property 
from M & W Enterprises through Roy Miller (TR 16-19; Defendant's 
Exs. 35, 36, 38, 40). Other facts and events demonstrate that 
something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' representation of 
their fee-simple ownership of the property. Such facts and 
events include the "distress" sale of the property by the 
Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one half or less of its 
market value (Tr 11-12, 15, 10), the $14,000.00 finder's fee paid 
to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase price paid by Dakal 
of $37,980.00 (Tr 19-21) and the same day transfer of the 
property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for $60,000.00 (Tr 
20-21; Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6). All of the above, when viewed as a 
whole, clearly establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not 
bona fide purchasers under Utah statutory and case law (TC 8). 
American acknowledges that Dakal's representative directly 
communicated with American regarding the existence of American's 
lien (RB 36, Tr 18 L 15-20). On page 13 of their respondents' 
brief, Dakal and Diversified note that the overlap between the 
definition of actual notice and good faith is considerable and 
then cite the following: 
Good faith ordinarily exists where the purchase is made 
with an honest purpose; good faith is absent where 
ignorance of outstanding interests is deliberate and 
intentional; and it has been held that a want of caution 
and diligence which an honest man of ordinary prudence 
is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in 
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. 77 Am.Jur 
2d Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 646, p. 761. 
American submits that in order to exhibit good faith by 
exhibiting an honest purpose, plaintiffs or someone representing 
them should have made American aware that plaintiffs possessed 
information which suggested that American had released its lien by 
mistake. Good faith in Dakal's purchase is absent because 
ignorance of outstanding information possessed in behalf of Dakal 
was deliberate and intentional by not being communicated to 
American. Further, "good faith" has been defined to consist in an 
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious 
advantage of another. ... Cooper v. Flesner, 103 P. 1016, 1019 
(1909). Thus, American asserts that any vitiating fact, the truth 
of which might been ascertained by proper inquiry, deprives a 
party of the defense of being an innocent purchaser. G. Thompson, 
8 Thompson on Real Property §4326 at p. 458 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in this reply brief and in American's earlier 
appellant's brief, the Court of Appeals not only disturbed the 
Findings of Fact made by the trial court which clearly was in the 
best position to make said findings, but also failed to hold that 
plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the real property. 
American respectfully submits that the trial court's findings were 
not erroneous, let alone "clearly erroneous," or against the 
weight of evidence. 
Based upon the above and the contents of its earlier 
appellant's brief, American respectfully submits and urges this 
Honorable Court that the Court of Appeals has rendered an opinion 
which conflicts with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
in so doing has so far departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings that this Honorable Court should reverse 
the Court of Appeals' Opinion and affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 1988. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
H. MifflfnWilirair^t^I^ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
American Savings & Loan 
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OCA 57-1-6 
RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND EFFECT -
INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT -
Every conveyance of real estate/ and every instrument of 
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate 
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as 
notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded 
in the office of the recorder of the county in which such 
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding 
between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
ment, certification or record, and as to all other persons 
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instru-
ment, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal 
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such instru-
ment is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries 
or stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge 
any third person with a notice of interest of any person 
or persons not named in such instrument or the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and 
clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an 
instrument recorded as herein provided setting forth the 
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed 
in describing the property charged with such interest. 
OCA 57-3-3 
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD -
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall 
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any por-
tion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded. 
EXHIBIT 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC-, a 
Utah corporation, and : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DAKAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, : CIVIL NO- C-83-2042 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al., : 
Defendants- : 
I- NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of 
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (herein-
after "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title 
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"), 
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located 
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. In addition, 
defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American"), in plaintiffs' original action, has filed: (1) 
a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging 
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property 
and have been unjustly enriched a>t American's expense; (2) a 
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter 
EXHIBIT 2 
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VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American 
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald 
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased 
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint 
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter 
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched 
at American's expense. 
II. FACTS 
The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen 
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and 
events dating back to 1978. The Court has carefully reviev/ed 
the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed 
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary 
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses. 
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts 
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of 
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration 
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore 
refer to such Stipulation when necessary. In the following 
Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where 
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Trans-
cript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity 
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order 
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular 
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is 
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally 
determines the rights and claims of all parties. An equity 
court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the 
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief 
of the parties. See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.; 
27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq. 
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers 
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court 
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to 
be done,- and similarly, it can and should regard as not having 
been done that which ought not to have been done." These state-
ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states 
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings." 
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by 
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous 
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements 
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following 
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties: 
A. NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY 
The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified 
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus 
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the 
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice" 
of American's security interest in the property which was 
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified. Et 
is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight 
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been 
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice. The 
Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of 
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to 
statehood. Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before 
the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs. 
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual 
notice" as follows: 
This statute was under examination by 
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah 
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held 
that the "actual notice" required by 
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party 
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dealing with the land had information 
of facts which would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to 
the state of the title. See a similar 
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson, 
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948) 
[Emphasis added] 
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the 
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order 
to be a bona fide purchaser. In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah 
442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs. 
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement: 
[W]hatever is notice enough to excite 
attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of every-
thing to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, he 
shall be deemed conversant of it. 
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293. 
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows: 
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a 
reliable source from which the true 
state of facts will be naturally 
disclosed, it is not sufficient that 
the purchaser make an inquiry of a 
person when he knows that it is to 
such person's interest to misrepresent 
or conceal the existence of the out-
standing interests and that such 
person does deny its existence. 
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case, 
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a 
bona fide purchaser of the property. The Court is in substantial 
agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages 
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984. 
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peek, the President and principal executive officer 
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property 
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23). The Court also concludes 
that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the 
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal 
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal 
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs' Exs. 5 & 6; 
Defendants* Exs. 4 2 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein). 
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified 
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual 
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, 
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are 
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust 
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American. 
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more 
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry 
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation 
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing 
its Trust Deed on the property. Such an inquiry would have 
in all probability led to the discovery that neither the 
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. Both Pentelute 
and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed 
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were 
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and 
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at 
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises 
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants' Exs. 35, 36, 
38, 40). 
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events 
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should 
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' 
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property. 
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property 
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less 
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00 
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day 
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for 
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21; Plaintiffs' Exs. 2, 6). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the above-
mentioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly 
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers 
of the property under Utah statutory and case law. 
B. THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity 
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean 
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment. 
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that 
the Rydalches do jiave "unclean hands" by reason of their representa-
tions of fee simple ownership of the property with no security 
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property 
without the written or oral approval of American. 
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises 
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject 
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's 
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly 
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed 
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement 
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale 
or transfer of the property (Defendants' Ex. 35). The Rydalches 
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for 
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart 
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of 
the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that 
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title 
Co. for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain 
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the 
property (Defendants' Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer 
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred 
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of 
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based 
upon an appraisal of the property by Academy Appraisal Associates 
(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance 
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed 
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40). 
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that 
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property 
was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have 
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable 
relief. It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with 
the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent 
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises. 
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable 
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their 
representations that American's interest in the property had 
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal. 
C. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT 
As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified 
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunctio 
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra, 
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding 
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are 
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified 
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated. 
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to 
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid 
principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the 
same payment terms of principal and interest as American's origi 
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the 
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American' 
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security interest shall be Dakal. Dakal shall have six months 
to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any 
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance 
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such 
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal. All rental payments 
from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal. 
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the 
property. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches 
to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal. The $14,000.00 finders 
fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the 
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and 
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party 
to these proceedings. A Judgment by the Court is therefore 
rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00. 
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the 
property are terminated. 
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable 
of all the parties now before the Court. His only liability 
could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining 
the prior approval of American. Without ruling on the legal 
question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the 
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally 
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above. Therefore, 
all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property 
or American's claims against Liston are terminated. 
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most 
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated 
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino 
Corporation. However, none of these parties is now before the 
Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against 
any of them. 
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility 
for the events leading up to these proceedings. Although only 
mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the 
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the 
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its 
interest in the property. It is therefore the judgment of the 
Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which 
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court, 
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from 
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision, 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS. LISTON, ET AL PAGE THIRTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
and in accordance therewith. Such documents shall be submitted 
to the Court and other parties by ,inno ?n IQQA 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband 
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and 
wife; each idividually; and 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee 
and not individually; and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah bank-
ing corporation; and M & W ENTER-
PRISES, allegedly a Utah general 
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1 
through 10 being all other persons 
unknown/ claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs1 
ownership, or clouding their title 
thereto, 
Defendants. 
PRATT. 
C A H O O N 
• AT LAW 
ZA 
OHO SOUTH I 
t crnr, 
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I 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION, 
T h i r d - p a r t y 
P l a i n t i f f , 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C 8 3 - 2 0 4 2 
H o n o r a b l e J . D e n n i s 
F r e d e r i c k , J u d g e 
EXHIBIT 3 
i 
li ^ s . 
I STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS 
F. RYDALCH, 
! Third-party 
I Defendants. 
j THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
j 
| J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
! viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
I being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
ithe Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
IListon, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
j 
; Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 
j III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas R. Rydalch, Duane A. 
Burnett, Esq. 
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, makes the following: 
PIHDIHGS OF PACT j 
1. On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American11) made a loan to Donald J, and Karen H. Bailey in the 
' sum of $59,200, which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and 
a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, 
and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No, 3059974 at page 826 
of Book 4619 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
2. The real property (hereinafter "property") described in 
said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official 
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
• 3. In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to 
» 
, Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who 
t ; 
assumed the Baileys' loan with American upon American's approval 
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification 
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment. 
4. In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed 
» 
the above-described loanf the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance 
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment did remain in effect as to subsequent sales. 
5. On May 14f 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a War-
ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval 
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still sub-
ject to American's Trust Deed. 
6. On May 28, 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-
val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F. 
Rydalch (sometimes hereinafter "Rydalch") and his wife, Joan 
Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch 
as "Rydalches"). 
1. The Warranty Deed conveying the property from M & W 
Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property 
was subject to American's Trust Deed. 
8. The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, executed by the 
Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to 
American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed of Trust 
Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of Ameri-
can prior to any sale or transfer of the property. 
9. The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-
ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged 
that Stewart Title Company, the escrow and closing agent, had 
informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agree-
ment, and that the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify 
i 
Stewart Title Company for any consequences resulting from the ! 
failure to obtain written approval from American prior to the » 
transfer of the property. 
10. M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-
:
 ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the 
Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and 
insurance on the property. 
11. Based upon an appraisal of the property by Academy 
Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received a title insurance 
policy from Stewart Title Company in the amount of $103,000. 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself, 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of 
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement. 
12. The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further 
indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that 
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
13. American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust 
Deed on the property by reconveyance which was recorded on 
:
 December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in 
| the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
j 14. The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been 
« 
paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given. Said Trust Deed 
i continues to be unpaid. 
j 
{ 15. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
i 
balance owed to American under its Trust Deed is the sum of 
$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total 
$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, interest 
in the sua of $12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum of 
$1,956.28. CLYDE. PRATT, 
I BBS & CAHOON 
kTTOMNCYS AT LAW 
0 AMERICAN SAVINO* 
PLAZA 
•CONO SOUTH 
16- On February 17, 1983f American recorded its Affidavit as 
Entry No. 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that 
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mis-
take. 
17. Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
18. On January 21, 1983, for the sum of $37,980, the 
Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
(sometimes hereinafter •Dakal") which on the same day, sold the 
property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes here-
inafter "Diversified" or "Diversified Equities") for the sum of 
$60,000. 
19. Prior to the sale of the property to Dakal, Defendant 
Rydalch represented to Dakal that American1s interest in the pro-
i perty had been satisfied. 
j 20. At the time of the sale of the property from the 
i Rydalches to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President and principal 
executive officer of Dakal and Diversified. 
21. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
: the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
i 
' to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
i sified Equities. DE. PRATT. 
i & CAMOON 
INCVS AT LAW 
[RICAN SAVIMOS 
22. An individual by the name of Brad Pentelute arranged the 
I 
1 sale of the property (from the Rydalches to Dakal) in behalf of 
! Dakal and Wayne Peck. 
23. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
» 
i 
1
 and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of 
i 
I Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
j from Third-Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
* 
! 24. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
i 
cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
| Rydalch had actually satisfied the obligation to American and 
| whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
l
 L the property. 
i 
* 25. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
1
 the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the 
i obligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor 
anyone else had paid American and that American fs release of its 
Trust Deed was, in fact, a mistake. 
26. In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or 
should have known that something was amiss regarding the 
Rydalches' representation of their fee simple ownership of the 
property. Supporting facts include the "distress" sale of the 
property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or 
less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad 
Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of 
$37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to 
Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000. fOE PRATT 
s & C A H O O N 
RNCVS AT LAW 
KRICAN SAVINGS 
PLAZA 
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J 27. Both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had substantial 
I 
j experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate 
» transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market 
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's inter-
est in the property at the time the Rydalches acquired the pro-
perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the 
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches 
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien). 
28. The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value. 
29. Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to 
Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal. 
30. Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the 
Rydalches to Dakal. 
31. Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the 
total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been 
( paid in escrow or are currently due. 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
i 
} cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to American and 
whether American had aade a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
the property. 
2. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the 
obligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor any-
one else had paid American and that American's release of its 
Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. 
; 3, In addition, the Court concludes that Brad Pentelute 
and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that something was 
amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple 
ownership of the property. Supporting facts include the •dis-
tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approxi-
mately one-half or less of its market valuer the $14,000 finder's 
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980, and the same-day transfer of the 
property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000, 
4. Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had "actual notice" of 
American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly 
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from 
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified. 
5. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of 
I Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
i 
[ 6. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
! the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
sified Equities. 
7. The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck 
1
 are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities in regard to 
i 
American's Trust Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by Ameri-
can. 
I 8, Therefore, Dakal and Diversified Equities had "actual 
notice" of American's security interest in the property which was 
» mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified Equi-
ties. 
i 9. Neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, Inc., 
nor Dakal, Inc., was a bona fide purchaser of the property. 
10. Thus, neither of the Plaintiffs, Diversified Equities, 
Inc., nor Dakal, Inc. should be entitled to prevail over Ameri-
can's claims against the property. 
11. The Rydalches either knew or certainly should have known 
| that their obligation to American had not been paid, since they 
: had not done so and that American's release of its trust deed on 
i the property had to be a mistake. 
i 
I 12. The Rydalches have "unclean hands" by reason of their 
j representations of fee simple ownership of the property with no 
security interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the 
property without the written or oral approval of American. 
13. Because one who comes before a court of equity with 
"unclean hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treat-
ment, the Rydalches are not entitled to favorable, equitable 
relief. 
14. All transactions regarding the transfer of the property 
from Dakal to Diversified should be rescinded and all rights 
and/or liabilities of Diversified Equities to the property or 
Dakal, respectively, should be terminated. DE. PRATT. 
5 ft C A H O O N 
»NCYS AT LAW 
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15. Pursuant to its original trust deed dated January 27, 
1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 
826 in Book 4619 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder in Salt Lake County, Utah, American is entitled to an 
j equitable lien upon the property for the amount of unpaid princi-
! 
i pal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the same pay-
i 
i 
i ment terms as American's original trust deed (as set forth in this 
! paragraph) and all other terms of said trust deed with the speci-
! 
fie exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's 
security interest should be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc. 
16. Title to the property should be quieted in Dakal, sub-
ject to an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of 
! unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely 
| the same payment terms of principal and interest as American's 
i 
original trust deed (dated January 27, 1978 and recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on February 2, 1978, as 
Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619) and all other terms of 
said trust deed, with the specific exception that the sole obligor 
or trustor of American's security interest should be Dakal, 
17. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
j balance owed to American under its equitable lien is the sum of 
$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said equitable lien (which 
total $15,886.00) consist of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, 
interest in the sum of $12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum 
of $1,956.28. 
^LYOE. PHATT. 
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j 18. Dakal should have six months from May 30r 1984, to bring 
, current all arrearages for monthly payments and any arrearages for 
i the reserve account (which is used to pay taxes and insurance on 
:
 the property). 
19. All principal interest and reserve account payments to 
j American under its equitable lien should be the sole obligation of 
: Dakal. 
i 
» 
20. All rental payments from tenants of the property paid in 
escrow or currently due in the total sura of $325.00 should be paid 
to Dakal. 
21. The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
j of Dakal in the amount of $37,980, the sale price of the 
; property. 
» 
22. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches 
! to Dakal should remain as paid by Dakal. 
! 23. The $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Dakal 
! or Wayne Peck was not part of the sale price of the property. 
| 24. Judgment should be rendered against the Third-party 
Defendant Rydalch and in favor of Dakal for $37,980. 
25. All rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defendant 
Rydalch relating to the property should be terminated. 
26. Defendant Liston is the least culpable of all the par-
ties now before the Court. 
27. Without ruling on the legal question of whether Liston 
may still be liable pursuant to the terms of American's Non-
Assumption Agreement, it would be inequitable for Defendant Liston 
f to remain personally liable to American. 
| 28. All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Liston relat-
; ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
j terminated. 
I 29. All rights and/or liabilites of Defendant Liston relat-
; ing to the property or American's claim against Liston should be 
» terminated. 
; 30. The Court concludes that because all of the parties now 
;
 before the Court bear some responsibilities for the events leading 
up to these proceedings and because the result of the entire chain 
of events would not have occurred except for the negligent and 
J unilateral mistake of American in releasing its interest in the 
! property, each party should bear its own costs and attorneys fees. 
1
 Also American is not entitled to any late fees which have accrued 
as of May 30, 1984. 
DATED this day of July, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
LYOC. PKATT. 
IBS ft CAHOON 
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71 Dennis Frederick 
District Court Judge 
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Attorneys 
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Duane A. Burnett, Esq. 
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DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation. 
Plaint iffs, 
vs. 
MARK ENGAR LISTON? ROY L. MILLER 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband 
and wife? BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and 
wife? each idividually? and 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee 
and not individually; and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS k LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
banking corporation BEEHIVE THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSOCI*"IP,, a Utah bank-
ing corporation? «i.:d M & W ENTER-
PRISES, allegedly a Utah aeneral 
partnership? and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1 
throuqh 10 being all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs* 
ownership, or clouding their tide 
thereto, 
Defendants. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION, 
Third-party 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. T83-2042 
Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge 
EXHIBIT 4 
vs. 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS 
F. RYDALCH, 
Third-party 
Defendants. 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch, Duane A. 
Burnett, Esq. 
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all tne 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That all transactions regarding the transfer of real 
property (hereinafter "property") situated in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, and more particularly described hereinbelow 
from Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., to Plaintiff, Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Plain-
tiff, Diversified Equities, Inc., to the property or Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc., respectively, are terminated. The property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
LOT 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFI-
CIAL PLAT THEREOF, recorded in the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
2. Pursuant to its original trust deed dated January 27, 
1978, and recorded as Entry No. 3059974 at page 326 in Book 4619 
of the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Association 
is the holder of an equitable lien upon the property for the 
amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon 
precisely the same payment terms as Defendant American Savings & 
Loan's original trust deed (as set forth in this paragraph) and 
all other terms of said trust deed with the specific exception 
that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American Savings & 
Loan's security interest shall be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc. 
3. That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., owns in fee simple the real 
property situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and 
described hereinabove, subject to an equitable lien in favor of 
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association for the amount of 
unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely 
the same payment terms of principal and interest as Defendant 
American Savings & Loan!s original trust deed (dated January 27, 
1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 
826 in Book 4619, of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder) and all other terms of said trust deed with the specific 
exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American 
Savings & Loan Association's security interest shall be Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc. 
4. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
balance owed to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association 
under its equitable lien was the sum of $56,742.92. The arrear-
ages under said equitable lien consist of principal in the sum of 
3 1 ,?a?_6f) / interest in the sum of $ 19 ^  19 , and reserve 
account (for taxes and insurance) in the sum of $ 1,956.28
 L 
5. That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., shall have six months from 
May 30, 1984, to bring current all arrearages f6r monthly payments 
and the reserve account. 
6. Defendant American Savings & Loan Association shall not 
be entitled to any late fees which have accrued as of May 30, 
1984. 
7. From May 30, 1984, all principal, interest and reserve 
account payments to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association 
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under its equitable lien shall be the sole obligation of Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc. 
8. All renta} payments paid by tenants of the property 
which have been paid in escrow or which are currently due in the 
sum of $325.00 shall be paid to Dakal, Inc. 
9. Third-party Defendant Douglas P. Rydalch has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., in the 
amount of $37,980 and judgment is hereoy rendered against 
Third-party Defendant Douglas Rydalch and in favor of Plaintiff 
Dekal, Inc., for $37,980. 
10. That all rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defen-
dant Douglas F. Rydalch relating to the property are hereby ter-
minated «, 
11. That the closing costs of the conveyance from the 
Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., shall 
remain as heretofore paid by Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
12. All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston relating to the property are terminated and the claims of 
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association against Defendant 
Liston as set fortn in Defendant American Savings fc Loan Associa-
tion's Counter Claim against said Defendant are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
13. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees 
incurred herein. fj 
DATED this ^ J day of"jun>£r 198^. 
BY THE/QOURT: 
ATTEST 
H\ DIXON HINOLEY 
- 5 -Dftputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and cor-
rect copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the offices 
of the following counsel this 20th day of June, 1984: 
Jerome H. Mooney, Esq. 
Arthur H. Strong, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
356 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
I hereby certify that on June 20, 1984, I personally hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and 
Order to the offices of the following counsel: 
David J. Knowlton, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
2910 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84402 
Duane A. Burnett, Esq. 
710 West 2125 South 
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 
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for the court to dismiss with prejudice 
and prevent future consideration of the 
claims should the defect be corrected. 
The trial court abused its discretion by 
entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Id at 1020. 
[3] In this case we believe the court 
abused its discretion in not allowing the 
amendment or granting a continuance. 
Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could 
it, but instead relied on the specter of in-
creased costs and complexity if the amend-
ment was granted. Despite the parties be-
ing represented by the same counsel 
throughout the proceedings and despite 
there being no surprise, the dismissal with 
prejudice was granted. While courts are 
given great latitude and discretion in the 
application of the law, they still must have 
sufficient grounds to apply the "harsh and 
permanent remedy" of a dismissal with 
prejudice. No such grounds appear here. 
The dismissal with prejudice and the 
judgment are reversed and the case is re-
manded for trial. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
,. gtion. Rule 19(a) instructs the trial 
rt to join as a party a person whose 
00
 nCe will prevent complete relief among 
\o& *k**dy parties. A plain reading of 
a led 17(a) and 19(a) reveals that the trial 
art should make every effort to insure 
^it the proceeding adjudicates the rights 
/ those necessary and intended to be be-
/ fe the court In conjunction with this 
u i^c concept is the requirement in Utah 
o O-P- 15W which states that leave shall 
. f ^ y given to amend a pleading when 
\j5tice so requires. This admonition is giv-
n in the sentence which declares that sub-
sequent amendments to pleadings may be 
m*de only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party. 
[2] Defendant cannot claim that it was 
not aware of plaintiffs status as a partner-
ship as early as nine months prior to the 
oral. During the taking of depositions in 
August of 1983, defendant's counsel was 
informed that plaintiff was a partnership. 
Plaintiffs status was also revealed to de-
fendant both by the Stipulation and Order 
to Amend mailed to counsel and at the 
pre-trial settlement conference.1 
The issue of dismissing an action with 
prejudice was recently addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville Tower 
a Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1986). The trial court's dismissal for 
fiilure to join indispensable parties was 
affirmed but the Supreme Court remanded 
with the instruction to enter the dismissal 
without prejudice. That Court wrote: 
While the court below properly exercised 
its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs ac-
tion for failing to comply with Rule 19(a), 
it was improper to do so with prejudice. 
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
4Kb) is a harsh and permanent remedy 
when it precludes a presentation of a 
plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our 
rotes of procedure are intended to en-
courage the adjudication of disputes on 
&eir merits. 
(Q f «Y*U*MISYJUH> 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah 
corporation. Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, et al.. Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860287-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 22t 1987. 
Not having considered the merits of 
plaintiffs claims, there was no reason 
c ^ , 1 " * 1 , c o u n s e l f° r defendant admitted re-ceiv
*ng the request to stipulate to the filing of 
Action was brought to quiet title to 
property. The District Court, Salt Lake 
the Second Amended Complaint but stated that 
he was unwilling to so stipulate. 
EXHIBIT ..5/ 
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County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., quieted 
title in subsequent purchasers subject to 
equitable lien in favor of holder of trust 
deed. Appeal was taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that unrecorded 
conveyance was void as against subsequent 
purchasers. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser «=»229<2) 
For unrecorded conveyance to be void 
as against any subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for valuable consideration, 
subsequent purchaser must show he had no 
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge of 
prior conveyance or that prior conveyance 
did not impart constructive notice or that 
prior conveyance was not recorded before 
his conveyance in same land was recorded. 
U.OA.1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser <&»229<2) 
If a subsequent purchaser has infor-
mation or facts which would put prudent 
person upon inquiry which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to state 
of title, unrecorded conveyance is not void 
as against subsequent purchaser. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser «»229(2) 
Unrecorded conveyance was void as 
against subsequent purchasers, although 
mortgage broker and principal of subse-
quent purchasers had sufficient informa-
tion to necessitate further inquiry on status 
of trust deed; broker and principal acted 
with sufficient diligence to meet duty im-
posed by doctrine of inquiry notice by hav-
ing title search performed and personally 
contacting trust deed holder which mistak-
enly stated that loan was paid off. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong, 
Mooney & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams III, 
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and respondent 
Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellants Diversified Equities T 
versified) and Dakal, Inc. (Dakal) b ^ ^ 
an action to quiet title to a duplex a^ l 
in Salt Lake County. Respondent A ^ 
can Savings and Loan (American) ^T* 
recorded security interest in the prmw * 
which was released prior to the conveyj? 
es to Diversified and Dakal. The lo 
court quieted title in Dakal, subject to** 
equitable lien in favor of American equal ^  
the principal amount owing on the n 
secured by American's previous trust deed 
Dakal seeks reversal of the lower court 
judgment and an order that Dakal ow* 
the property in fee simple, free of an? 
interest in American. Diversified, which 
bought the property from Dakal, seeb r* 
versal of the judgment below and an order 
upholding its rights against Dakal in the 
property. We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
So far as is relevant for this appeal, 
which concerns only the rights of Dak-
al/ Diversified and American inter sty the 
dispute was submitted to the lower court 
on a detailed stipulation of facts read into 
the record by counsel. Although there are 
several transactions, the key facts are rela-
tively simple. 
On January 2, 1978, American loaned the 
Baileys $59,200, which was secured by i 
trust deed to the property in question. The 
trust deed was recorded in February 1978. 
The property was then sold in 1980 u> 
Liston, then on May 14, 1982 by Listen to 
M & W Enterprises. Although M 4 W did 
not pay cash, Liston parted with title to the 
property. M & W's future obligations 
were not secured by the subject proper? 
but instead Liston was given a trust deeo 
in other property, which proved to be 
worthless as security. M & W sold the 
subject property to Rydalch on May » 
1982, as the first part of a contempt* 
exchange transaction. The property ** 
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abject to American's original trust American's trust deed had been satisfied. 
^
I S a n c U * '• ~ " • '" ' ~ ' 
various closing papers. 
*Z*A and the deed to Rydalch so recited, as Pentelute was furnished a copy of the re-
fc*^ •-.,« Mnsi cr Daners. conveyance. Pentelute then contacted 
Wayne Peck, a principal in both Dakal and 
Diversified, who agreed to purchase the 
property. Pentelute ordered a title search, 
order to purchase the property from 
& W, Rydalch borrowed $18,000 from 
r who took in return a note for $19,- . . . 6
 M & W's principal, Miller, promised which disclosed nothing unexpected except 
a lis pendens recorded in September 1982 
on behalf of Liston. To facilitate the sale 
which would raise his repayment, on Janu-
ary 21, 1983, Holzer obtained a release of 
the lis pendens, albeit with a bad check, 
and the sale from Rydalch to Dakal was 
closed later that day. 
Dakal paid $38,260 for the property and 
paid Pentelute a $14,000 finder's fee. Dak-
oay Holzer within 30 days. Instead, 
wller skipped town. Rydalch then at-
oted to sell the property to raise the 
* ey to repay the note to Holzer and had 
^attorney, Burnett, investigate the liens 
the property. Burnett learned from an-
other financial institution that its trust 
JLj of record had actually been dis-
charged and he secured a reconveyance. 
gydalch and Burnett then called American
 aj immediately recorded its warranty deed 
t total of three times and, while the first and soid the property to Diversified for 
call was inconclusive, were told each of the 
other times that the loan to the Baileys had 
been repaid. Rydalch apparently chose not 
w be too curious about who his benefactor 
might be. 
Prompted by the telephone calls, Ameri-
can executed and recorded a reconveyance 
in early December 1982. American subse-
quently discovered that the loan had not 
been paid and that there was a balance due 
in excess of $55,000. Apparently American 
erred because the Baileys had some thirty-
four loans with American, and American's 
records were somewhat confused. The tri-
ll court concluded that American was neg-
ligent in reconveying the property.1 
Meanwhile, Holzer began threatening 
Rydalch that he and his family would sus-
tain bodily harm if the amount due him was 
not paid. Although Holzer had received a 
trust deed to the duplex property, he want-
ed cash. Rydalch then responded to an ad 
placed by Pentelute, a self-described mort-
age broker specializing in distressed 
*ies. Pentelute spoke to Rydalch, Ry-
daich's attorney Burnett, and American, 
*«d received confirmation all around that 
I- The reconveyance gives every appearance of 
<*«»* the product of a deliberate—and delibera-
H T " " * ^ " " * "V?11 Keco™*y*accn was signed 
*Y one officer and attested by another. It recit-
edihat written instructions
 l o r c c h a d 
°«n received from the beneficiary and tkat »k-
note secured by the trust deed had been orient 
«d for endorsement. It additionally recited th 
$60,000. A month later American, having 
discovered its mistake, recorded an affida-
vit stating that it had released the trust 
deed in error and that the trust deed was 
still in effect. 
On these facts,2 the trial court held that 
Diversified and Dakal were not bona fide 
purchasers of the property. It concluded 
that Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had 
more than sufficient information to necessi-
tate yet further inquiry into whether Ry-
dalch or any one else had actually satisfied 
the obligation to American and whether 
American had made a mistake in releasing 
its trust deed on the property. The trial 
court cited the following facts as imposing 
upon Pentelute and Peck a duty of further 
inquiry: the reference to American's lien in 
Rydalch's deed; the sale of the property by 
Rydalch to Dakal for approximately one-
half or less of its market value; the $14,-
000 finder's fee paid to Pentelute compared 
to the purchase price of some $38,000; and 
the same-day transfer of the property from 
Dakal to Diversified. The trial court qui-
eted title in Dakal, subject to an equitable 
lien in favor of American. 
the reconveyance was executed by authority of a 
resolution of American's board of directors. 
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include noth-
ing inconsistent with the conclusion that the 
dealings of Rydalch and Dakal, through the bro-
ker Pentelute. were at arm's length. 
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The issue on appeal is whether there was 
sufficient notice of a "lien" on the property 
to require a duty of further inquiry by 
DakaL If there was, Dakal was not a bona 
fide purchaser and took the property sub-
ject to American's "lien."3 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
[1] Under our recording statute, an 
unrecorded conveyance is "void as against 
any subsequent purchaser in good faith 
and for valuable consideration of the same 
real estate . . . where his own conveyance 
shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). However, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), unrecord-
ed documents affecting real property are 
enforceable as against persons with "actual 
notice." Thus, "[a] subsequent purchaser 
must . . . show that he had no actual notice, 
i.e., no personal knowledge, of a prior con-
veyance or that the prior conveyance did 
not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not 
recorded before his conveyance in the same 
land was recorded." Utah Farm Prod 
Credit Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 
904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). Wayne Peck and 
Pentelute obviously did not have construc-
tive or record notice because American had 
mistakenly released its trust deed and re-
corded its reconveyance before they dealt 
with the property. 
[2] As for the "actual notice" exception 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), the 
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pente-
lute did not have actual knowledge of 
American's interest However, the excep-
tion is also triggered if a party dealing with 
the land has information or facts which 
would put a prudent person upon an in-
quiry which, if pursued, would lead to actu-
al knowledge as to the state of the title. 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the 
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvi-
dently recorded reconveyance is to leave the 
lien created by the trust deed in legal existence, 
albeit unrecorded. We are not asked to decide 
whether reconveyance has the legal effect of 
actually terminating the lien created by a trust 
deed and rendering the accompanying note, if it 
has not been repaid, unsecured. 
1983). Whether a party should be ch 
with "actual notice," either in the sen ^ 
having actual knowledge or bein?
 0 °* 
quiry notice, turns on questions of f ^ 
See id. The trial court "found" that P ^ 
and Pentelute were chargeable with "a-
al notice." ' *tu" 
EFFECT OF STIPULATED PACTS 
Generally, a trial court's findings of f 
are accorded great deference. Howev 
without regard to the labels used, wh 
those "findings" proceed from stipulate 
facts, as in the instant case, the "finding" 
are tantamount to conclusions of law, with 
the stipulation of facts being the functional 
equivalent of true findings of fact See 
Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala 
1980). See also City of Spencer t> Haw^ 
eye Security Ins. Co., 216 N.W.2d 406,408 
(Iowa 1974) ("Where the facts are not in 
material dispute, interpretation placed 
thereon by trial court becomes a question 
of law which is not conclusive on appeal."); 
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 
(Mo. 1979) (only issue on appeal was wheth-
er trial court drew the proper legal conchi-
sions from the stipulated facts). On ap-
peal, this court reviews conclusions of law 
for legal correctness. Copper State Thrift 
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
App.1987). See Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
[3] After a careful review of the stipu-
lated facts, we cannot agree with the lower 
court's conclusion of law that Pentelute 
and Peck (as opposed to Rydalch, who 
clearly knew better) had sufficient informa-
tion to necessitate further inquiry into the 
status of American's trust deed.4 
4. The previously identified specific faicton re-
lied on by the court in support of its conclusion 
that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide 
purchasers do not tilt toward that result. Refer* 
ence in Rydalch's deed to American's, interest 
was meaningless in the face of American's suo-
sequent reconveyance. A distress sale well be-
low market price can be prompted by numerous 
factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipuiiuon 
of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed w 
sell so cheaply because he could not secure * 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES v. AMER. SAV. & LOAN Utah H 3 7 
Cite M 739 P2d 1133 (UuhApp. 1987) 
While the circumstances were suspicious 
and called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for 
peck, inquired—and with sufficient dil-
igence to meet the duty imposed by the 
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title 
search performed and he personally con-
tacted American even though the results of 
Rydalch's and Burnett's three prior con-
tacts were accurately—if disingenuously— 
communicated to him and even though he 
had a copy of the reconveyance. American 
confirmed what the title search, the recon-
veyance, Burnett, and Rydalch all told him. 
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakal and Diversi-
fied, reasonably relied on the title search 
and the clear evidence, both documentary 
and verbal, of American's reconveyance.5 
American negligently released its trust 
deed, and its security interest will not be 
preserved against bona fide third party 
purchasers who, at least on the facts as 
loan since the duplex was not owner-occupied 
and because of the lis pendens against the prop-
erty. In addition, it was actually stipulated that 
Rydalch was under extreme pressure because of 
Holzer's threats of violence and because of the 
imminency of a trustee's sale noticed by Holzer. 
A hefty finder's fee is to be expected where a 
free-lance broker finds a property which can be 
had for a comparative song, A same-day trans-
fer from one related entity to another might be 
effected for a number of tax or business rea-
sons. In this case. Diversified was a group of 
investors put together by Peck but who. unlike 
Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal. The 
back-to-back sales left the Diversified sharehold-
ers with a property worth more than they had to 
pay for it, while netting Dakal. in which Peck 
apparently had a greater interest, S8.000.00 
profit. 
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make 
inquiry and to diligently do that which the an-
stipulated, were bona fide purchasers with-
out notice and without further duty to in-
quire., To hold otherwise would defeat the 
purpose of the recording statutes and sub-
vert the sound commercial policy they pro-
mote. 
We reverse and remand with instructions 
to quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified, 
as their interests may appear, as against 
American. Each party shall bear its own 
costs of appeal. 
JACKSON and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
Co | KCT NUMUK SYSTEM > 
swer to the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pente-
lute's inquiry elicited an answer which was con-
sistent with the reconveyance document he had 
seen, the title report, and Rydalch's and Bur-
nett's reports about what they were told. It 
would stretch the notion of inquiry notice be-
yond the breaking point to hold that the answer 
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American 
should have prompted him to go further. What 
would he have done? Demand to see receipts, 
instructions for reconveyance from the benefi-
ciary to the trustee, or the chairman of Ameri-
can's board? He obviously had some concern 
or, with a reconveyance regular on its face in 
hand, there would be no reason to call Ameri-
can for verbal confirmation of the fact of recon-
veyance. But a duty to inquire is not a duty to 
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set 
straight. See also Note 1. supra. 
